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It has been long debated whether environmental tax reform (ETR), i.e. a revenue-
neutral shift of the tax burden from labour to carbon emissions, can have a double 
dividend, in terms of climate and economic goals. So far this question has been 
addressed in public finance and environmental economics using models with 
rational and representative agents. Here we examine the relevance of deviating 
from these standard behavioural assumptions. Our motivation is that research from 
other fields indicates that impacts of both environmental and income taxation on 
households are sensitive to behavioural biases, such as habits, imitation or status 
seeking. A related feature is that consumers and firms are heterogeneous with 
respect to many characteristics, some of which are crucial for the distributional 
effects of a tax reform. We combine insights from social psychology and 
behavioural, evolutionary and labour economics to identify behavioural cases in 
which the impacts of an ETR is likely to differ significantly from those in the 
traditional framework. Our findings show that households’ time use patterns and 
the distinction between extensive and intensive labour supply are relevant and 
deserve more attention.  
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1. Introduction 
With anthropogenic climate change likely exceeding the goals set by the international 
community in Paris 2015, the need for comprehensive climate policies and their 
appropriate assessment is more urgent than ever. A revenue-neutral tax shift away from 
labour and towards carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, i.e. an environmental tax reform 
(ETR), is widely considered as such a policy. So far the analysis of ETRs has largely 
taken place within the domain of public finance and environmental economics relying 
much on computable general equilibrium (CGE) and macro-econometric models. These 
tend to focus on representative or average and rational behaviours of consumers and 
firms.  
Here we discuss how considering different types of behaviour, social interactions 
and heterogeneity of firms and households results in a richer understanding of the 
mechanisms underlying, and outcomes of, environmental tax reforms. Bounded 
rationality and non-market social interactions explain how information and innovations 
diffuse. This is relevant as an ETR is supposed to trigger low-carbon innovations and 
transitions. Recent studies on ETRs are increasingly paying attention to heterogeneity 
(e.g., Aubert and Chiroleu-Assouline, 2019; Fullerton and Monti, 2013; Jacobs and de 
Mooij, 2015; Jacobs and van der Ploeg, 2019; Rausch and Schwarz, 2016). This allows, 
among others, to more accurately account for distributional impacts of the policy. 
However, heterogeneity is often limited to only one dimension, or where studies go into 
more detail, there is a disconnect with the macro level.  
This study offers a critical review of modelling practices to evaluate the impacts 
of environmental tax reforms. We examine whether and how a heterogeneous population 
of boundedly-rational and socially-interacting firms and households can affect the 
mechanisms of environmental tax reforms, and thus outcomes in terms of relevant 
economic and environmental indicators. To this end, we synthesise the results from the 
traditional literature in public finance with insights from behavioural and evolutionary 
economics, adding observations from labour economics and studies on time use. In the 
last decade, behavioural economics has come to be seen as particularly important in the 
context of environmental and energy policies (Allcott and Mullainathan, 2010; 
Gsottbauer and van den Bergh, 2011; Shogren and Taylor, 2008). Evolutionary 
economics is relevant as it can offer insights about how the combination of multiple, 
heterogeneous agent populations affects climate policies. We offer an explorative study 
aimed at assessing important model elements or assumptions that deserve investigation. 
The result can serve as an input to subsequent quantitative model and policy studies 
focusing on a particular element or assumption in more detail.  
In this study we focus on the so called ‘employment double dividend’ (EDD), 
denoting a reduction in both environmental pressure (notably CO2 emissions) and 
unemployment, given the limited space we have available. The EDD is highly dependent 
on decision making and thus particularly interesting from a behavioural perspective. It 
harmonises two goals that are often presented as being conflicting, namely emissions 
reduction (an environmental goal) and employment (an economic goal).  
We will evaluate outcomes under distinct sets of behavioural assumptions with 
respect to these two dividends. Our analysis follows a three-step procedure. First, we 
identify the main mechanisms through which an ETR is commonly assumed to culminate 
in an employment double dividend in existing economic models. Second, we critically 
review central modelling assumptions. Third, we examine double-dividend outcomes for 
a number of cases combining relevant behaviours, heterogeneity and social interactions 
of agents, making use of the mechanisms identified in step two to illustrate how policy-
makers can benefit from increased realism of economic models. 
Following this approach, we find that complementarity between household 
consumption of leisure and commodities is not necessarily conducive to an employment 
dividend. The opposite may hold true when one distinguishes between extensive and 
intensive labour supply, i.e. the number of employed people and the hours worked per 
employee, respectively. The reason is that increased labour supply through employed 
individuals can undermine the creation of new jobs. On the firm side, emissions reduction 
is achieved through costly abatement. If companies are not able to establish product or 
process innovation, they may face extinction. Notably, equity impacts are influenced by 
heterogeneity of skills and consumption choices. In addition, time use is relevant, 
especially for the labour-leisure trade-off, but has been neglected in traditional studies of 
ETR.  
 The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 offers an 
introduction to the double-dividend notion and a roadmap to this study. Section 3 sketches 
the mechanisms of environmental tax reforms and how they relate to an EDD (Section 
3.1). Next, in Section 3.2 it offers a critical discussion of several key assumptions in the 
light of different streams of literature and summarises the resulting additional 
mechanisms we think should receive attention in modelling and policy analysis. Section 
4 presents the results of a qualitative assessment of different behavioural cases. Section 5 
discusses the main insights. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Context and approach  
2.1. The double-dividend notion 
Research on environmental tax reforms centres on the double dividend (DD) hypothesis, 
the notion that one might reap two types of benefits from the policy: one of environmental 
and the other of economic nature. This combines the concept of Pigouvian taxation, aimed 
at internalising (environmental) externalities, with the need for distortive taxation in 
second-best economies1. While existingstudies tend to represent the first dividend 
through greenhouse gas or CO2 emissions reduction, the economic dividend has been 
approached in various forms. Most authors view it either as enhanced efficiency of the 
tax system (Bovenberg and de Mooij, 1994) or increased employment (see e.g. 
Bovenberg and van der Ploeg, 1998; Bovenberg and van der Ploeg, 1998; Koskela and 
Schöb, 1999; Nielsen et al., 1995). We will concentrate our analysis on the latter, also 
known as the employment double dividend (EDD). While carbon taxes are first and 
foremost instruments of climate policy, the revenues they are able to generate have 
triggered much debate about if their use can achieve a second, i.e. economic or welfare, 
dividend.  
 A persistent terminological contribution of Goulder (1995) is the distinction 
between a weak and strong DD. Both take environmental improvement through a tax shift 
as given. The strong DD notion implies economic improvements compared to a situation 
with no tax reform. This means an environmental tax could be based on pure efficiency 
grounds, regardless of its environmental benefits. The weak DD means that there are 
economic benefits of recycling the pollution tax revenues through cuts in distortionary 
taxation as compared to returning them to households in a lump-sum fashion, but that 
there are not necessarily economic improvements compared to the absence of a pollution 
tax. This hypothesis is supported analytically by Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994). 
Empirically, Bovenberg and Goulder (1996) confirm this result using a numerical model 
of the United States’ economy. Based on a literature review, Ekins and Speck (2011, p.37) 
summarise that empirical models typically find a weak double dividend. 
 
1 For a more general discussion of Pigouvian taxation in second-best economies see for instance 
Bovenberg and Goulder (2001). 
Theory and empirics of the double dividend 
Most studies show improvement in environmental quality due to pollution taxes. See 
Bosquet (2000) for an overview of empirical modelling results, or Andersen and Ekins 
(2009) for an overview of real world cases of ETR in Europe. A recent meta-analysis of 
ETR simulations using CGE models also concludes that there is consensus about ETRs 
leading to environmental improvement, while the second dividend remains ambiguous 
(Freire-González, 2018). Some authors have suggested that environmental benefits may 
be disappointing under certain conditions (Bosello et al., 2001, p.34 or Bayindir-Upmann 
and Raith, 2003).  
The bulk of the literature in public economics focuses on the existence of the more 
disputed strong double dividend. It is difficult to draw clear conclusions from analytical 
models, because as soon as they are extended, for instance with out-of-equilibrium labour 
markets, there are no longer generally accepted results for a potential strong double 
dividend. Recycling tax revenues through tax cuts can result in an efficiency dividend 
only if an initially sub-optimal tax system moves closer to an optimum. Expectedly, many 
scholars have identified pre-existing distortions, particularly in the labour market, as a 
crucial condition for the existence of a strong DD (e.g. Bovenberg and Goulder, 1996). 
The meta-analysis by Freire-González (2018) shows the ambiguity of the results: out of 
69 simulations from 40 different studies using CGE models, 55% find evidence for the 
existence of a strong double dividend and 45% do not. An older study by Patuelli et al. 
(2005) performs a meta-analysis of 186 simulations (61 studies) including both CGE and 
macro-econometric models. Their statistical analysis reveals that the type of revenue-
recycling and the type of model used both significantly influence the impact of an ETR 
on gross domestic product and employment. 
 
2.2. Conceptual Approach 
The outcomes of every model depend crucially on its underlying assumptions. The 
modeller’s ideas about the functioning of a policy shape the structure of the model (see 
Figure 1). We perform a synthetic, critical literature review, followed by a qualitative 
analysis to develop hypotheses about how different behavioural assumptions may affect 
the outcome of environmental tax reforms. As a first step, we undertake a literature review 
focused on analytical and numerical models of environmental tax reforms. We highlight 
key mechanisms used in these models we encountered when reviewing literature from 
public and environmental economics (“Literature review A”). Each of their assumptions 
implies certain mechanisms in the model (“Model structure”) and affects the model 
outcomes, as shown in our conceptual framework (Figure 1).  
In a second step, we add insights from other fields, such as behavioural or 
evolutionary economics (“Literature review B”). We attempt to synthesise the results 
from our two literature reviews and point out the relevance of interdisciplinary insights. 
Accounting for the results from Literature review B can affect some of the widely used 
assumptions for modelling ETRs as well as the mechanisms (Section 3.2).  
Finally, we hypothesise about the potential impacts of altering these assumptions 
on the expected outcome of the policy using sets of distinct behavioural cases (Section 
4). As the literature review follows an explorative approach, the topics are selected in a 
subjective manner and we do not claim to be comprehensive. [Figure 1 near here] 
3. Synthetic literature review 
3.1. Basic mechanisms of environmental tax reforms  
In most analytical ETR models, firms are assumed to decide about the combination of 
input factors to maximise their profit. The upper half of Figure 2 represents the labour 
demand side with the effects of the policy on carbon emissions and labour demand. A 
carbon tax raises the unit cost of carbon emissions (1)2, mainly through a higher price on 
production inputs with a high carbon content, such as fossil fuels. The tax cuts enabled 
through revenue recycling ensure that the unit cost of labour falls (2). Indeed, labour costs 
may theoretically rise, for instance, due to strong labour unions. For simplicity, we 
assume the case where tax recycling is strong enough to overcome these opposing effects 
on labour costs so that the net labour cost falls. In order to lower its costs and maximise 
profits, the representative firm will try to replace carbon emissions with labour (3 and 4). 
This is the driving force for innovation that incentivises firms to adjust their production 
function. [Figure 2 near here] 
If the benefits of reduced labour costs are split between employers and employees, 
for instance by recycling revenues through both income and payroll tax cuts, not only will 
the cost of labour then fall, but also households’ after-tax nominal wage rate will increase 
(6). The latter is expected to promote labour supply because higher nominal wages 
increase the opportunity cost of leisure (7). The labour-leisure decision is complex, 
because the relative prices of clean commodities, dirty commodities and leisure all change 
simultaneously. Carbon-intensive goods become more expensive compared to labour-
intensive goods. The exact impacts on the supply and demand of labour, and consumption 
of clean, i.e. low-carbon, and dirty, i.e. high-carbon, goods cannot be determined ex ante. 
These depend on the production technology and ability to innovate on the firm side and 
on preferences and habits on the household side (arrows 3, 4, 5, 7 and 8).  
Table 1 summarises the main mechanisms found in the literature on ETRs in 
public economics. Direct effects correspond to price changes triggered by the tax reform. 
 
2 The numbers in parentheses in this subsection all refer to arrows in Figure 1, e.g. (1) refers to 
arrow 1. 
Indirect effects include impacts on household labour-leisure decisions and the firm input-
factor decisions. In Table 1, as for the remainder of the paper, we assume a general rise 
in the consumer price index as indicated by empirical studies (Freire-González, 2018)3. 
This can be justified based on the current reliance on carbon emissions of virtually all 
consumption. [Table 1 near here]  
3.2.Critical assessment of model assumptions 
Homothetic preferences 
ETR analyses traditionally assume that household preferences are homothetic, implying 
that a change in income does not affect the share of expenditure for different types of 
goods (see e.g. Bovenberg and de Mooij, 1997 ; Parry and Bento, 2000, Babiker et al., 
2003). Under these preference assumptions uniform commodity taxes are optimal and 
lump-sum recycling is most desirable on efficiency grounds (i.e. when ignoring the 
environmental externality). The model of Babiker et al. (2003) shows that tax cuts can 
reduce welfare compared to lump-sum recycling of carbon tax revenues. Parry and Bento 
(2000) employ a static model with homothetic preferences between two pollutive 
consumption goods, one of which is deductible from the income tax. An income tax 
reduction in this case leads to higher net wages and a shift from tax-favoured to non-
favoured goods. We would expect an analogous effect if the labour tax cuts induced some 
kind of shift between dirty and clean consumption goods. This welfare gain (termed 
“strong revenue-recycling effect”) changes, when the homothetic preference assumption 
is loosened (Parry and Bento, 2000, p.22).  
 
3 It should be pointed out that the evidence is limited: only five simulations in Freire-González 
(2018) include a consumer price index.  
Homothetic utility functions are a convenient assumption for the tractability of 
models, but questionable when confronted with empirical evidence. Indeed, the carbon 
intensity of consumption tends to decrease with rising income. While rich households on 
average generate higher total emissions per capita, low income households need to assign 
a larger share of their expenditure to emission-intensive consumption such as energy use 
for heating or cooking (Büchs and Schnepf, 2013; Chitnis et al., 2014; Jones and 
Kammen, 2011; Weber and Matthews, 2008).  
Data for the United States used by Sager (2019), for instance, shows that the 
expenditure share for energy services4 is higher for low income households than for high 
income households. According to an analysis of survey data from the United Kingdom 
(UK), CO2 emissions are regressive in income for home energy and indirect emissions5, 
whereas transport emissions seem to be more ‘homothetic’ in the sense that they increase 
almost proportionally with income (Büchs and Schnepf, 2013).  
Some recent models of ETR policies incorporate a subsistence level of polluting 
consumption by assuming Stone-Geary preferences. Aubert and Chiroleu-Assouline 
(2019) consider a model with heterogeneous workers and imperfect labour markets. Only 
under specific assumptions, including a low subsistence level of polluting consumption, 
the initially regressive reform can be rendered Pareto-improving through a non-linear 
income tax. A study by Jacobs and van der Ploeg (2019) shows that improvements in 
social welfare are possible without deteriorating inequalities, namely if the government 
uses lump-sum transfers besides labour taxes. Finally, Klenert and Mattauch (2016) 
 
4 Energy services include air travel, electricity, gasoline, heating fuel and natural gas. 
5 Indirect emissions are those not directly emitted by the household, but embodied in 
consumption of food, recreation or personal care, for instance. 
investigate different revenue recycling options, finding that only lump-sum recycling of 
tax revenues will lead to a progressive result, while all other recycling options render the 
reform regressive. 
Weak separability 
Another common, yet difficult assumption is weak separability between leisure and 
commodity consumption (Babiker et al., 2003; Bovenberg, 1999; Parry and Bento, 2000). 
It means that households allocate constant fixed expenditure shares to leisure and 
commodity consumption. This implies that the labour supply decision and consumption 
choices are independent, i.e. the amount of labour supply does not affect the types of 
goods and services consumed. A notable exception is Parry (1995), who analyses the 
optimal pollution tax when leisure and consumption are separable. He concludes that a 
DD may materialise only if leisure and the polluting consumption good are sufficiently 
weak substitutes, while most other early models of environmental tax reform find a 
double dividend under the assumptions of complementarity between leisure and polluting 
consumption paired with weak separability. A study by West and Williams III (2007) 
estimates the cross-price elasticity between gasoline and leisure using United States 
household expenditure data, finding these goods to be complements. Using a demand 
system without homotheticity and separability, they show that the optimal gasoline tax 
rate should be more than one-and-a-half times the rate one would find using a separable 
utility function. Parry and Bento (2000) speculate that in their ETR model relaxing the 
assumption of weak separability would lead to additional welfare gains through positive 
feedback on labour supply (p.23). 
Such feedback effects are highly relevant. While increased income through higher 
labour supply allows for more budget to be spent on consumption, it also reduces the time 
budget for leisure. How people spend, and what they consume during their free time, 
influences the carbon intensity of their consumption. Hence, it is important to account for 
how commodity consumption of a household responds to changes in time use, for instance 
when they enter employment. Individuals may substitute time-intensive with time-saving 
consumption when working hours increase. Goods and services which require processing 
– be it physical or mental – are likely to be replaced with alternatives that require less 
time, but are often more carbon-intensive. Examples are replacement of reading with 
recreational activities that require special equipment or travel such as outdoor sports6, 
substitution of raw food ingredients with processed foods, or shifting to faster 
transportation modes.  
The most recent time use survey for Germany, for instance, confirms that eating 
and drinking outside the house as well as entertainment and culture activities are 
predominantly performed by employed households, while unemployed individuals are 
likely to spend more time on food preparation and other activities that take place in their 
own home, as well as on the job search. Compared to an employed person, an unemployed 
person on average spends more than twice as much time on preparing meals at home and 
on household work. Jobless households also undertake more low-emission activities like 
walking and sleeping (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2015). In addition, this data shows that 
the unemployed invest more time in home-based cultural activities, such as reading, 
artistic activities or games, whereas employed people have a higher time expenditure for 
cultural events outside the home. This includes visits to the cinema, theatre or amusement 
 
6 Some studies of time use show that time spent on reading is declining, while household spend 
more time on sports and outdoor activities (see e.g. Jalas and Juntunen, 2015) . The material 
and emission intensity of these activities is highlighted for instance by Aall et al. (2011) in a 
study for Norway.  
parks (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2016). In a time use study for France, De Lauretis et al. 
(2017) show that high-income households attribute less time to sleep, the least carbon-
intensive category. The hypothesis that employed households engage in more carbon-
intensive activities is supported also by results of Gough et al. (2011), who find that 
working households in the UK have higher emissions than unemployed households when 
other factors, including income, are controlled for. Not only unemployment, but also part-
time work may be correlated with low- or high-carbon activity patterns.  
It has been recognised that the degree of substitutability between leisure and 
commodity consumption affects the likelihood of a double dividend to occur. Two 
examples illustrate this. First, assume that for Household A free time and holiday 
consumption are complements (negative cross-price elasticity). In this case, a rise in 
holiday prices reduces the demand for both leisure and holidays, so wage and price 
changes work in the same direction. The reason is that a price rise for holidays makes 
leisure time more expensive relative to working time, which promotes labour supply.  
The overall effect on labour supply is less clear, if leisure and commodity 
consumption are substitutes. To illustrate, assume Household B has to commute to work 
by car, so the cross-price elasticity of leisure and the car is positive. A carbon tax in this 
case raises the price of car use and hence the cost associated with working. While a higher 
wage promotes labour supply, the increase in commuting costs works in the opposite 
direction.  
The representative household 
The typical analytical model for ETR analysis assumes a representative agent with 
upward sloping labour supply (e.g. Bovenberg, 1999; Bovenberg and de Mooij, 1994). In 
reality the goal of the policy is to stimulate employment at the extensive margin, i.e. to 
create more jobs and reduce unemployment rates, rather than to encourage employed 
people to work more hours and thus curb intensive labour supply. This distinction is 
naturally neglected when a representative household is used, although empirical studies 
show that the wage elasticity of labour supply varies widely between groups of 
households. According to Fleetwood (2014), the shape and existence of labour supply 
and demand curves are highly uncertain. The wage elasticity of labour supply for instance 
is often found to be negative and labour supply curves can be backward-bending instead 
of upward-sloping. Women typically have relatively higher wage elasticities than men 
and their intensive and extensive labour supply reactions to wages differ. This is highly 
relevant for an ETR, because employees who respond to a policy by increasing their 
working hours may inhibit the creation of new jobs and thus undermine a second 
dividend. 
Recently, Jacobs and de Mooij (2015) suggested that the weak double dividend 
only holds for models assuming a representative household. The reason is that in these 
models, no redistribution is necessary or desirable and hence income taxes are 
distortionary. When households are heterogeneous in skills, however, the distorting effect 
of labour taxes is balanced out by distributional gains under optimal taxation. In this case 
the marginal cost of public funds equals one and cutting distortionary taxes does not imply 
welfare gains. Deviations in the optimal environmental tax level compared to the 
Pigouvian rate may still occur, but they will depend on the complementarity between 
labour and consumption or environmental quality. 
 Skill heterogeneity is rather established in public economics, and is a key reason 
for the second-best theory of optimal taxation7. The abilities of low- and high-skilled 
households are commonly approximated through income, warranting the labels low- and 
high-income households, respectively. This distinction has been used sparsely in ETR 
studies in the past, but is gaining momentum lately. The need for including skill 
heterogeneity is also important with respect to potential discrimination on the labour 
market.  
A second type of heterogeneity we want to consider is pro-environmental preferences. 
We assume that they contribute to a lower carbon-intensity of consumption, ceteris 
paribus. As utility is not only derived from leisure and commodity consumption, but also 
from preserving the natural environment, households exhibiting pro-environmental 
preferences have a higher willingness to pay for ‘green’ goods. Hence, an ETR would 
likely result in different price responses from households with distinct environmental 
preferences. While we assume for the sake of our analysis that the carbon tax increases 
awareness about pollution and hence may produce a stronger demand reaction among 
agents with pro-environmental preferences (crowding-in), the monetary incentive itself 
might cause a crowding-out effect, i.e. erode initial intrinsic motivation. Both forms of 
crowding effects have been shown to be empirically relevant (Frey and Jegen, 2001), with 
the net effect being uncertain in general. However, this does not affect our general point, 
which is that demand reactions vary across individuals. 
 
7 See Lipsey and Lancaster (1956) for the basic idea of the theory of second-best and Diamond 
and Mirrlees (1971a, 1971b) for a first comprehensive application of it to optimal income 
taxation. 
For practical purposes we limit ourselves to these two types of heterogeneity, while 
noting that other interesting types of household variation exist and have already received 
some attention. The meaning of spatial heterogeneity between urban and rural populations 
for tax incidence of the French energy tax reform of 2018, for instance, is addressed using 
a formal model by Douenne (2020). This study shows that the incidence of energy taxes 
can depend strongly on the ownership and thus use of capital goods with particular 
energy-use features, such as cars or homes.  
 
The atomistic household 
Consumption choices are not made in a vacuum, but determined by socio-cultural context, 
that is, influenced by others with possibly different information, resources or preferences. 
An important example of other-regarding preferences, i.e. preferences influenced by peer 
behaviour, is status seeking. Discussed already in 1899 by Thorstein Veblen, it is now 
widely accepted as an important driver of consumption. According to Frank (1985), under 
status-seeking, consumption and income taxes alleviate existing distortions caused by the 
under-consumption of non-positional goods, i.e. goods that depend relatively little on 
how they ‘compare with things owned by others’ (Frank, 1985, p.101), to the advantage 
of positional goods, for which comparison with others is important. In various studies, 
Norman Ireland shows that a tax on positional – or conspicuous – consumption itself, as 
well as income taxation can lead to Pareto improvements, which leads him to conclude 
that over-consumption leads to over-supply of labour (Ireland, 1994, 1998, 2001).  
If positional consumption is carbon-intensive compared to non-positional 
consumption, employment and consumption should be too high and an employment 
double dividend accordingly more difficult to achieve. The result will also depend on the 
source of the budget for positional goods: increased labour supply affects both dividends, 
whereas shifting expenditure between goods will affect mostly the environmental 
dividend. In a study on the interrelationship of mobility and status, Gössling and Nilsson 
(2010) argue that institutions like “frequent flyer” programs encourage this polluting 
activity by interlinking flying with social status. If status was instead conveyed through 
low-carbon commodities or behaviours, it would facilitate the consumption transition that 
ETR aims to initiate. Examples include college education, reading particular types of 
literature or consuming ecologically sustainable food (see e.g., Currid-Halkett, 2017 for 
an overview of these new subtle status symbols in the United States). 
A number of additional behaviours have been studied in the context of social 
interaction, including the adoption of energy-efficient technologies based on peer-
behaviour (Bollinger and Gillingham, 2012) or attitudes towards climate policies based 
on political affiliation (Dietz et al., 2007; Tobler et al., 2012). Although we focus on status 
seeking, our point is to illustrate the general relevance of social, non-market interaction 
for agent decisions and hence ETR outcomes. 
The representative firm 
Just as households are heterogeneous, so are firms. The effect of an environmental tax 
reform will likely differ across different sectors and trigger different strategic reactions. 
We thus want to introduce two possibly relevant types of heterogeneity on the firm side. 
As discussed in Section 2 an ETR changes the relative and absolute prices of carbon and 
labour. We account for differences in the ratio of labour to carbon firms use to produce 
one unit of output. This distinction is relevant if the reactions are non-linear based on this 
key feature that determines the policy’s impact on a company. In an empirical study for 
Sweden, Brännlund et al. (2014) find that the impact of a carbon tax on environmental 
performance is almost twice as large for firms in energy-intensive sectors compared to 
non-energy-intensive companies. Bumpus (2015) carries out interviews with high-level 
strategic decision makers of energy-intensive firms in British Columbia which reveal that 
firms with low carbon-intensity see the tax as a compliance cost burden rather than an 
innovation opportunity. In addition, a high share of firms in energy-intensive and 
industrial sectors is extremely environmentally pro-active in climate change mitigation 
compared to other firms. This last point is the conclusion of a study among 552 companies 
in Europe and North America (Backman et al., 2017). Not surprisingly, the studies above 
indicate that emission-intensity seems to determine different reactions of firms to an ETR, 
justifying this type of heterogeneity. 
The second type of firm heterogeneity that will be considered in our analysis is 
firm size. Empirical evidence points to firm size as a crucial determinant for strategic 
choices such as innovation, both in response to climate policies, but also other changes in 
a firm’s environment. The results of the aforementioned study also show that large firms 
are more pro-active than small firms, although this difference is much more significant 
for Europe than for North America (ibid.). Another study by Audia and Greve (2006) 
investigates the effects of low performance on strategies and risk taking behaviour of 
small and large firms in the Japanese shipbuilding industry. Their conceptual framework 
is the shifting-focus model of risk taking which assumes that managers pay attention to 
more than one reference point. Only small firms switch to less risky strategies when they 
perform below their aspiration levels in this study. Large firms do not adjust the riskiness 
in their decision making. The authors explain this by the higher proximity between small 
firms’ survival points and their aspiration levels which makes them more vulnerable to 
extinction. Together this evidence gives rise to the question whether the impacts on and 
responses of firms of different size to an ETR will vary. Additionally, firm size is likely 
correlated with some other key characteristics for strategy choice, such as the age of the 
company, its market power and political influence and its access to financial capital. The 
main difference we will assume in our analysis is that small firms may be forced to exit 
the market more easily than their larger competitors. Another type of heterogeneity that 
could be relevant for future research is trade-intensity, as Yamazaki (2017) shows in an 
ex-post empirical evaluation of the environmental tax reform in British Columbia, 
Canada. 
A neglected factor that connects firms and households is skill requirements, 
because demand for high and low-skilled labour can develop distinctly, depending on 
firms’ strategic reaction to a tax reform. In a meta-analysis of labour demand, covering 
151 studies containing 1334 estimates, Lichter et al. (2015) find that the wage elasticity 
of labour demand is higher for low-skilled workers than for the average worker. It is 
unclear whether an ETR will lead to a proportional increase in labour demand for high- 
and low-skilled households. When difference in skills is addressed, it is usually connected 
to revenue recycling. For instance, Bosello and Carraro (2001) simulate an ETR using a 
labour market that is disaggregated in terms of skills. They find that recycling revenues 
to all workers results in a higher employment boost than limiting the transfers to low-
skilled workers. The study by Aubert and Chiroleu-Assouline (2019) mentioned earlier 
introduces the possibility of unemployment among low-skilled workers into a model of 
ETR through a search and matching approach. Low-skilled labour supply is inelastic, 
while high skilled labour is supplied endogenously. Hence low-skilled workers can be 
employed or unemployed (extensive margin), while high-skilled workers choose the 
amount of hours they supply (intensive margin). In this case, a progressive labour tax can 
increase disincentives to work, but could simultaneously increase employment among 
low-skilled workers. Accounting for these effects highlights trade-offs between 
efficiency and equity. Assuming merely a general increase in labour demand discards the 
fact that low-and high-skilled individuals tend to have different options and that 
companies will discriminate between skills depending on the strategy they apply.  
One strategy of companies is to save energy by replacing machines or energy 
inputs directly with human labour. In that case they likely hire low-skilled labour. This 
may slow down or reverse recent trends in automation in assembly of cars, machines or 
packaging processes, for instance, but is unlikely to be adopted in all sectors. Another 
strategy of firms is to hire high-skilled workers who adopt or develop innovations which 
reduce carbon intensity. In addition, a producer can switch to an entirely new product or 
service, which may or may not change the skill structure among its employees. A car 
manufacturer for example might switch from automobiles with a combustion engine to 
electric vehicles because of a tax-induced shift in demand. This restructuring is unlikely 
to change the skill levels needed in the production process. Firms in different sectors are 
likely to make different choices among these options under the influence of an ETR and 
thus the impacts on the labour market are less clear than previously anticipated. One study 
showing the ambiguity of input elasticities is Fiorito and van den Bergh (2016). Studying 
volumes and prices of production inputs in the manufacturing sector of seven 
industrialised countries8, they find mostly negative cross-price elasticities between labour 
and energy inputs, indicating complementarity. For Germany, the United Kingdom and 
the United States however, the corresponding cross-price elasticities are positive, 
indicating potential to substitute away from carbon emissions. 
 
The atomistic firm 
 
8 These countries are France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Spain the United Kingdom and the United 
States. 
Environmental tax reforms are usually analysed in a typical neoclassical setting 
with an isolated representative and profit-maximising firm. Cyert and March 
(1963)’s book A Behavioral Theory of the Firm lay the foundation for boundedly 
rational firm behaviour for various disciplines. Evolutionary economics focuses on 
the role of populations of agents interacting over social networks. This allows for a 
more disaggregate approach and an emphasis on change processes, which provides 
important advantages when studying the dynamic pattern of ETR impacts resulting 
in a major transition away from a high-carbon economy.  
 
Satisficing 
We abandon the doctrine of profit-maximisation and replace it with aspiration levels 
reached through the application of routines. Routines are one of the core concepts of 
evolutionary economics, defined as repeated sequences of (inter-)action, based on Nelson 
and Winter (1982). Forming the social analogy to genes in biological evolution, routines 
carry information, can mutate or be adjusted and hence are central to all processes of 
transition, selection and innovation of firms. Routines make firms inert, but at the same 
time they create a stable environment for decision making. We will assume that a firm 
only tries to adjust its routines, if it performs below its aspiration level. The formation of 
aspiration levels can be considered as a type of satisficing behaviour. Based on the theory 
of structural inertia we will assume that routine use makes large firms more inert than 
smaller firms. Regarding the ETR we can assume that routines slow down the transition 
process compared to profit-maximising firms. The use of aspiration levels means that 
only firms which are negatively affected by the tax reform, i.e. perform below their 
aspiration levels, will react to the policy with structural changes. For small firms routines 
imply an extra pressure for preventing extinction, because any delay in reaction to the 
policy can threaten their existence and lead to market exit. 
 
Innovation through social Interaction 
On the firm side social interaction between different companies is especially important 
with respect to the search and innovation process. Basically there are two types of 
interaction: imitation of competitors and cooperation. According to (Rycroft, 2007), the 
dominant assertion is that network-based partnerships are at the core of faster innovation. 
That is because these collaborations can deal better with the variety and uncertainty of a 
globalised economy. While this hypothesis is not uncontested, for our analysis we will 
assume that interaction between firms increases the speed of innovation diffusion and 
thus the potential of a double dividend to occur. Furthermore, social interaction should 
particularly improve the survival rates of small firms in a changing environment as they 
can lower their search costs. 
 
On the perception of taxes 
The idea that tax-induced price changes generate distinct demand responses when 
compared with equivalent market price fluctuations has been termed tax salience (Rivers 
and Schaufele 2015, p.24). While distinct reactions to taxes and other price changes are 
not necessarily relevant for analytical models, different demand elasticities are highly 
relevant for numerical analyses of environmental tax reforms. Rivers and Schaufele 
(2015) study the effects of the ETR in British Columbia and find that under a tax rate of 
$25/tCO2e the demand reduction induced by the local carbon tax is four times as strong 
as suggested by price elasticities. A study by Brännlund et al. (2014) observes a similar 
‘signalling’ effect of carbon taxes in the context of the Swedish ETR. Analysing micro-
level firm data, they discover that the tax reduces the carbon intensity of production 
significantly more than an equivalent change in fuel prices. The effects of carbon taxes 
compared to other price changes are illustrated in Figure 3. [Figure 3 near here] 
Traditional models do not account for salience or signalling effects, but tax changes 
are expected to have the same effect as equivalent price changes. Two early studies of tax 
salience performed by Chetty et al. (2009) and Finkelstein (2009) focus on households in 
the United States. Whereas Chetty et al. show that higher salience of taxes amplifies the 
demand reaction, Finkelstein’s results indicate that lower tax salience reduces the demand 
elasticity.  
In an empirical investigation of the demand reaction to gasoline taxes, Li et al. (2014) 
use household- and state-level data from the United States. Compared to tax-inclusive 
gasoline prices a gasoline tax induces a stronger demand reaction for fuel consumption 
as well as vehicle choice. A recent study by Andersson (2019) estimates the effect of the 
Swedish carbon tax on emissions using a quasi-experimental approach with a synthetic 
control of comparable OECD countries. It finds a carbon tax elasticity of fuel 
consumption three times larger than the price elasticity. While the drivers of these results 
cannot easily be determined, all the previous studies indicate that some form of tax 
salience or signalling effect seems to apply to both households and firms. 
 
The impacts of changing assumptions on model mechanisms 
We have laid out the main mechanisms through which an employment double dividend 
is expected to be realised in Section 3.1 and discussed a number of key assumptions in 
Section 3.2. While potential impacts of different assumptions about agent behaviour on 
the double dividend will be analysed in Section 4, implications for the channels through 
which the policy works, i.e. for the model structure, are summarised in Table 2. The left 
columns are identical with Table 1 whereas the column on the far right adds more subtle 
insights about mechanisms we identified in Section 3.2. [Table 2 near here] 
Questioning homothetic preferences implies that one needs to expect different 
demand reactions by high and low income households following an ETR (i). How 
households use their free time when their employment situation changes is a crucial 
determinant of the carbon intensity of their consumption and hence the effectiveness of 
the tax reform (ii). The distinction between labour supply at the intensive and extensive 
margin, respectively, introduces an additional threat to the employment dividend (iii). 
Workers who increase their hours of labour may prohibit the creation of new jobs. Last 
but not least, the strategic choice of firms in reaction to an ETR will determine whether 
demand for high- or low-skilled labour increases (iv). We will now turn to developing 
concrete behavioural cases with distinct assumptions about households. 
 
4. Analysis of distinct behavioural cases 
In this section we will apply the insights presented in Section 3 to the mechanisms of 
environmental tax reforms in the form of eight different behavioural cases. Outcomes will 
be evaluated in terms of the likelihood of an employment double dividend, i.e. CO2 
emission reduction and an increased employment rate. We will evaluate each agent along 
the mechanisms identified in Tables 1 and 2. As the price change for carbon- and labour-
intensive goods is expected to work in opposite directions, it is unclear what exactly will 
happen to the overall commodity price index (CPI). To simplify the analysis, we will 
restrict it to the case where the price index rises because almost all commodities will get 
more expensive, i.e. a rise in CPI. We perform a qualitative analysis of household 
reactions to ETR first and after that analyse the different firm cases. Due to uncertainty 
about the magnitude of the effects, we abstain from combining the two.  
4.1. The household decision 
We consider four different household cases: 
(1) HH-RR – one rational representative household (like traditional models: baseline) 
(2) HH-RH – rational, but heterogeneous households (differing in skills and pro-
environmental preferences) 
(3) HH-BRH – boundedly rational (prone to salience effects) and heterogeneous 
households 
(4) HH-SH – Socially interacting (through status-seeking) and heterogeneous 
households 
Household heterogeneity here always refers to the variety in skills and pro-environmental 
preferences discussed before. Rationality is a disputed concept. Here we refer to a rational 
household as an atomistic utility maximiser with complete information and perfect 
foresight. Table 3 presents the potential for a double dividend to occur across the four 
cases. The detailed steps of the analysis can be found in the appendix.  
To construct our baseline HH-RR case similar to traditional ETR analyses, we 
only use the channels in Table 1. An increase in nominal wage rates is expected to lead 
to an increase in labour supply and thus promote the second dividend. If commodity 
consumption and leisure are complements, a rise in commodity prices will strengthen 
both dividends, because price and wage rise promote labour supply and reduce 
commodity consumption. If leisure and commodities are substitutable, on the other hand, 
higher commodity prices still imply lower consumption, but also lower labour supply, 
thus strengthening the first dividend but weakening the second. The relative potential for 
a double dividend is represented in the upper left cell of Table 3. The dividends should 
not be interpreted as dividends received by a certain type of household, but rather display 
how different types of households contribute to an overall double dividend. [Table 3 near 
here] 
Column 2 displays the HH-RH case where households are rational, but heterogeneous 
in skills and preferences. The potential for a DD varies widely between the high- and low-
skilled groups. There are three main reasons for this pattern. First, the tax reform may 
stimulate intensive labour supply and thus inhibit the creation of new jobs. Second and in 
connection to the criticism brought forward by Bayindir-Upmann and Raith (2003), 
higher employment almost certainly will translate into higher consumption, especially for 
low income groups. Third, the consumption of low-income households has been shown 
to be more carbon-intensive as they spend a larger share of their income on food, housing 
and energy (see Section 3.1). This is why we see negative impacts for the environment in 
these cells of Table 3. For high-skilled households the chances are better for both 
dividends because the substitutability between their commodity consumption and leisure 
actually leads to a decrease in intensive labour supply, thus promoting the EDD, rather 
than preventing it. Additionally, the higher distance to subsistence levels and decreasing 
marginal returns to consumption open up space for consumption reduction. 
For the behavioural case with tax salience (HH-BRH, column 3) we see a similar 
pattern as for the second case, but overall the likelihood of a DD seems larger. This result 
roots in the amplified demand reduction in response to a tax, compared to a price change. 
One might argue that this is only a short-term effect and in the long term the remaining 
income will be spent. What we have assumed here is that real income falls and households 
rather reduce their demand for commodities instead of increasing their labour supply to 
sustain their former consumption level. In this case there will not be any remaining 
income even in the long run. 
The last household case HH-SH assumes socially interacting heterogeneous agents 
and is displayed in the last column of Table 3. Here we see strong deviations from the 
former results. A crucial difference in the analysis is that we assume all households, 
including high-skilled individuals with pro-environmental preferences, to increase their 
labour supply at both margins. This is based on the analyses of Ireland (1998, 1994 and 
2001), and the assumption that status-seeking leads to over-supply of labour. One could 
criticise that status-seeking does not increase labour supply, but rather shifts resources 
from non-positional to positional goods (see e.g. Frank, 1985). From an environmental 
perspective however, status-seeking is problematic because it creates externalities. The 
essential question is how status is conveyed. We assume that the mainstream status 
symbols are very carbon-intensive, which is responsible for the negative results with 
respect to environmental benefits. The weak chances for an EDD stem from the strong 
increase in intensive labour supply. Pro-environmental preferences can make a difference 
in this case as they may promote the environmental dividend through low-carbon status 
symbols which are currently rather a niche than the norm in Western societies.  
In general we see that the DD potential is higher for high-skilled groups, in 
particular those with green preferences. More thought should be put into the distinction 
between commodities as leisure complements versus substitutes. This difference mainly 
stems from the time required to consume certain goods and thus there is a strong link 
between the labour decision and the consumption decision as mentioned earlier. Due to 
the distinction between intensive and extensive labour supply, our analysis further 
suggests a reversed pattern of influence of leisure complements on the EDD than is 
normally suggested. Since household heterogeneity and different behaviours can have a 
tremendous effect on the DD outcome, a more detailed analysis of ETR best devote 
attention to these. 
4.2. The firm decision 
Regarding the firm side, we also distinguish between four cases: 
(1) F-RR – one rational, i.e. profit-maximising, representative firm (baseline) 
(2) F-RH – profit-maximising heterogeneous (in size and labour-to-carbon ratio) 
firms 
(3) F-BRH –heterogeneous firms satisficing with aspiration levels and routines 
(4) F-SH – socially interacting heterogeneous firms 
In the F-RR case the ETR will lead to an increase in carbon efficiency which is positive 
for emission reduction, i.e. the environmental dividend. So is the second mechanism on 
the firm side: increased cost of carbon and lower labour cost lead to replacement of carbon 
with labour. This shift is expected not only to improve the environment, but also to have 
a positive impact on employment by raising labour demand (++/+). This baseline case is 
again based on the mechanisms from Table 1 and the result are shown in the upper left 
cell in Table 4. 
Similar to the household analysis, cases 2 to 4 are evaluated using Table 2, i.e. we 
use one additional mechanism9: market exit or extinction of firms. Overall the results 
suggest that the outlook is more positive for the environmental dividend than for 
employment. There is not much variation across the different cases within the types of 
firms, and the environmental benefits from energy-intensive industries are always at least 
as high as from the labour-intensive sectors. The latter result is not surprising. As energy-
intensive firms bear the largest share of the costs of the tax reform, they supposedly react 
strongest. In addition, they probably have the largest abatement potential. [Table 4 near 
here] 
 
9 Table 2 also includes different strategies for hiring low versus high-skilled labour. We only 
pay limited attention to these demand variations here, because we have no reliable 
information of strategy structures with respect to this point. 
Behavioural Case 2, F-RH, considers heterogeneity of profit-maximising firms in 
terms of size and carbon-intensity. We disregard the possibility of renewable energy use 
here, because this strategy will not have any impact on labour demand, and also refer to 
energy-intensity. The results show similar emission reductions among all energy-
intensive companies. For large firms these reductions are the result of efficient abatement 
due to economies of scale and innovation, whereas small energy-intensive firms are 
exposed to frequent extinction resulting in emission reduction. This comes at the cost of 
losing jobs among smaller companies and thus lowers the potential for the second 
dividend.  
Case 3 introduces decision making based on aspiration levels and routines 
(satisficing). The results are shown in the third column of Table 3. In this case the 
transition process slows down for all types of companies, because routine-based decision 
making introduces inertia. The greatest difference compared to case 2 pertains to small 
labour-intensive firms. The reason is that they are likely to exceed their original aspiration 
levels after an ETR and thus will not introduce any changes at all – based on the idea that 
firms react mostly when they underperform. While automation tends to cause job losses 
in small labour-intensive companies, such as in the service industry, labour cost 
reductions due to an ETR could help to protect jobs in these sectors. That is why we added 
the (+). The negative impact on employment for small energy-intensive firms stems from 
the increased extinction risk they are exposed to when they use routines compared to a 
traditional profit-maximiser. 
Social innovation which allows for cooperation among firms and imitation of 
competitors coins the fourth behavioural case, displayed in the last column. Our 
assumption is that these conditions will facilitate a faster innovation process and hence a 
more rapid transition away from carbon emissions. Extinction rates of small firms in 
energy-intensive industries are lowered, because they can copy successful competitors or 
economise on their resource use through cooperation. This has a positive impact on the 
second dividend. Even small labour-intensive firms may contribute to environmental 
improvements in this case because they can imitate emission reducing techniques from 
their larger competitors without investing a lot in R&D. A downside may be a lower 
demand for high-skilled labour in the R&D process. 
In sum, we take away three main insights from the firm analysis. Although we expect 
similar emission reductions within the distinct types of firms across our cases, the 
mechanisms to arrive there differ. For some of the companies, abatement comes about 
through market exit rather than innovation. This holds particularly when comparing small 
carbon-intensive firms with and without social innovation. Second, the different cases 
mainly affect the speed of transition, a factor that is neglected in traditional analyses. 
Third, as our examples of replacement of human labour through automation or lower 
research personnel demand in the case social innovation show, the different cases may 
affect different types of jobs in a separate manner. It is thus likely that they will affect the 
distributional outcome of an ETR. These factors should be included in the policy analysis 
in order to get a comprehensive picture, including equity impacts.  
5. Discussion 
Results of behavioural cases 
The qualitative analysis of four behavioural cases was performed for households and 
firms, respectively. Even if some of the results for the double dividend potential are 
similar to the baseline rational representative agent case (RR), the underlying mechanisms 
of an ETR and its side effects are much more differentiated than is usually considered. 
The distinction between extensive and intensive labour supply reversed our 
understanding of the impact of the substitutability between commodity consumption and 
leisure on employment. If leisure and consumption are complements, an ETR may 
increase the supply of labour at the intensive margin, which will inhibit, rather than 
support the creation of new jobs (employment dividend). Tax salience has a positive 
effect on emission reduction and on employment creation among the high-skilled labour 
force, whereas status-seeking may pose a serious threat to both dividends if positional 
consumption causes over-supply of labour.  
The analysis of firms shows higher potential for the environmental dividend in all cases 
compared to the baseline, and particularly in emission-intensive sectors. Adding the 
possibility of market exit threatens the second dividend for small firms. Emission 
reduction may be realised through extinction at the cost of losing jobs, rather than through 
innovation. We expect routine-based decision making and social innovation to affect the 
speed of the transition of the economy. Routines are likely to slow down the transition to 
a low-carbon economy while non-market interactions can accelerate it. Allowing firms to 
cooperate and imitate successful competitors probably decreases the risk of extinction for 
small firms as well. Finally, the shift from labour to carbon can happen through direct 
replacement of carbon through human energy or through innovation in carbon 
productivity as a result of R&D. The latter channel is most likely the more important one 
and will require high-skilled labour. Although an ETR may have the potential to 
temporarily slow down current digitalisation and automation trends, the outcome in terms 
of labour demand is likely to be skewed between high and low-skilled households. These 
different impacts for different segments of the population need to be considered in policy 
evaluations.  
The assessment was based on a combination of a critical literature review and 
additional own argumentations that integrated insights from different fields. It should be 
seen as a starting point for behavioural modelling approaches to studying the 
environmental and socio-economic impacts of ETRs. Given the broad scope, we had to 
be selective and focus on important cases, rather than offer an exhaustive treatment of 
potential behavioural assumptions and implications. Because of the qualitative nature of 
our analysis, we further had to neglect the interaction of behavioural cases, especially 
between firms and households. To more systematically address this, specific formal 
models are required, which can benefit from our explorative insights. Agent-based 
modelling is one technique to overcome restrictive assumptions of traditional models and 
to comprehensively incorporate relevant boundedly-rational and socially-interactive 
behaviours as well as heterogeneity in the context of ETR. These models have seen 
considerable application to climate policy (Castro et al., 2020), but not been 
systematically used to answer questions about a DD of an ETR. In future work we intend 
to elaborate some of the ideas exposed here along these lines.  
Limitations 
Only the basic channels of one type of dividend – the employment double dividend – 
were considered, while it should be noted that other definitions of the economic dividend 
and other channels exist and have been studied. Examples include  additional production 
factors (e.g. Bovenberg and van der Ploeg, 1998), informal labour markets (e.g. Goulder, 
2013, Bento et al., 2018) or health benefits (e.g. Williams, 2002). Our analysis 
concentrates on the impacts on labour and commodity markets. Based on empirical 
studies, we assumed a general rise in the consumer price index. We also assumed that 
benefits of the tax reform are split between employers and employees and we considered 
only labour and carbon as input factors to production. Altering these central assumption 
will likely affect our results. Finally, as we do not employ a model we cannot draw any 
conclusion about optimal tax policy. The point we want to make is that some of the typical 
assumptions should be re-evaluated with respect to empirical evidence and future models 
should be built with the necessary flexibility in mind. 
6.  Conclusions 
The aim of this study was to examine whether and how particular deviations in behaviour 
from rational representative agents affect the mechanisms set in motion by an 
environmental tax reform (ETR). To that end, a literature review was performed to 
identify the effects of the policy on labour and commodity markets. Adding insights from 
literatures on time use, labour studies and behavioural and evolutionary economics has 
provided insights about extending existing models of ETR with other relevant 
mechanisms (Table 2). 
One important result is that complementarity between leisure and commodity 
consumption does not have to be favourable for an employment dividend. Considering 
the distinction between extensive and intensive labour supply, the opposite can be true if 
increased labour supply through employed individuals undermines the creation of new 
jobs. Allowing for the possibility of firm bankruptcy can further threaten the employment 
dividend. Heterogeneity in skills and consumption choices affects the equity impacts of 
an ETR through tax incidence and potential shifts in labour demand. With respect to the 
labour-leisure trade-off, more attention should be paid to the use of time as a resource, in 
addition to income.  
Although we did not focus on the magnitude of the various behaviours on the 
outcome of an ETR, our analysis has revealed the importance of deviations from 
assumptions of traditional models. Not only do they have the potential to affect the 
outcome in terms of the double dividend – as already shown by recent ETR studies – but 
they actually require us to consider additional mechanisms through which the tax reform 
unfolds and re-think the way we model the environmental and socio-economic impacts 
of an ETR. 
 
Appendix – Detailed analysis of behavioural cases 
Table A1. Potential of an ETR to create a double dividend under various behavioural cases  
 ETR 
POLICY 











Insights from the literature in public 
economics (Section 3.1) → 
 Case 1: HH-RR – Representative and rational   
w  ↑ 1 Labour supply (LS) ↑ (-)/+ 
+/++ p  ↑ 2 Complements (CC) ↓ +/+ 
p  ↑ 3 Substitutes (CS) ↓ 0/0 
Results from Section 4.1  Case 2: HH-RH – Heterogeneity 
Case 3: HH-BRH – Tax salience Case 4: HH-SH – Status seeking 
Low skills 
(Upward-sloping 
labour supply, C and 




w  ↑ 
4 Extensive Ls ↑ -/+ 
---/0 
16 Extensive Ls ↑ -/+ 
0/0 
28 Extensive Ls ↑ -/+ 
---/- 5 Intensive Ls  ↑ -/- 17 Intensive Ls  ↑ 0/- 29 Intensive Ls  ↑ -/- 
p  ↑ 6 Demand for CC ↓ -/0 18 Demand for CC ↓ +/0 30 Demand for CC = -/- 
environmental 
preferences 
w  ↑ 
7 Extensive Ls ↑ -/+ 
--/0 
19 Extensive Ls ↑ -/+ 
-/+ 
31 Extensive Ls ↑ -/+ 
-/- 8 Intensive Ls ↑ -/- 20 Intensive Ls ↑ -/- 32 Intensive Ls ↑ -/- 
p  ↑ 9 Demand for CC ↓ 0/0 21 Demand for CC ↓ +/+ 33 Demand for CC = -/- 
High skills 
(Backward-bending 
labour supply, C and 




w  ↑ 
10 Extensive Ls ↑ -/+ 
0/+++ 
22 Extensive Ls ↑ -/+ 
+/++++ 
34 Extensive Ls ↑ -/+ 
--/- 11 Intensive Ls = 0/+ 23 Intensive Ls = 0/+ 35 Intensive Ls ↑ -/- 
p  ↑ 12 Demand for CS ↓ +/+ 24 Demand for CS ↓ ++/++ 36 Demand for CS = 0/- 
environmental 
preferences 
w  ↑ 
13 Extensive Ls ↑ 0/+ 
++/+++ 
25 Extensive Ls ↑ 0/+ 
++/++++ 
37 Extensive Ls ↑ 0/+ 
+++/++ 14 Intensive Ls ↓ 0/+ 26 Intensive Ls ↓ 0/+ 38 Intensive Ls ↑ +/- 




 Insights from the literature in public 
economics (Section 3.1) → 
 Case 1: F-RR – Representative and rational  
 
 
MCC ↑ 1 Carbon efficiency ↑ +/0 ++/+ 
MCL ↓ 2 Substitution ↑ +/+ 
Results from Section 4.2  Case 2: F-RH – Heterogeneity Case 3: F-BRH – Satisficing Case 4: F-SH – Social innovation 
Energy-intensive 
(Low L/C ratio) 
small 
MCC ↑ 3 Carbon efficiency ↑ +/0 
+++/0 
17 Carbon efficiency ↑ +/0 
++++/- 
1 Carbon efficiency ↑ ++/0 
+++/+ 
MCC ↑ 4 Extinction ↑ +/- 18 Extinction ↑ ++/-- 2 Extinction = 0/0 






MCL ↓ 6 Substitution 20 Substitution 4 Substitution 
large 
MCC ↑ 7 Carbon efficiency ↑ +/0 
+++/+ 
21 Carbon efficiency ↑ +/0 
++/+ 
5 Carbon efficiency ↑ +/0 






MCL ↓ 9 Substitution 23 Substitution 7 Substitution 
Non energy-intensive 
(High L/C ratio) 
small 
MCC ↑ 10 Carbon efficiency ↑ +/0 
++/+ 
24 Carbon efficiency = 0/0 
0/(+) 
8 Carbon efficiency ↑ +/0 
++/+ 
MCC ↑ 11 Extinction = 0/0 25 Extinction = 0/0 9 Extinction = 0/0 






MCL ↓ 13 Substitution 27 Substitution 11 Substitution 
large 
MCC ↑ 14 Carbon efficiency ↑ +/0 
++/+ 
28 Carbon efficiency ↑ +/0 
++/+ 
12 Carbon efficiency ↑ +/0 






MCL ↓ 16 Substitution 30 Substitution 14 Substitution 
Note: For more detailed explanation of each case, see the text below.
Households 
Behavioural case 1: HH-RRA – Representative and rational 
1. A higher wage increases labour supply [/+], which is good for the second dividend but potentially threatens the first [(-)/]. 
2. Commodity demand goes down after prices rise. This promotes the first dividend [+/]. If leisure and commodity 
consumption are complements it promotes the second dividend as well [/+].  
3. If they are substitutes there is a trade-off between leisure and consumption reduction. The effects on the first and the second 
dividend are unclear [0/0]. 
 
Behavioural case 2: HH-RHA – Heterogeneity 
Low-skilled HHs 
4. A higher wage rate promotes extensive labour supply and thus the second dividend [/+]. We assume that increased labour 
supply and lower complement consumption will lead to a shift towards substitute commodities. Since commodities that 
are substitutable for leisure are assumed to be time-saving, they likely have a higher carbon intensity [-/].   
5. A higher wage also promotes intensive labour supply for low income households as they are close to subsistence 
consumption. This is bad for the second dividend because it prevents the creation of new jobs [/-]. For consumption and 
the first dividend the argument from above holds [-/]. 
6. The commodity price rise induces a demand reduction. We assume that low income households with no environmental 
preferences replace these commodities with time-saving and high-carbon alternatives, thus leading to an overall negative 
impact on the environment. The impact of increased labour supply is unclear [-/0]. At the extensive margin it promotes the 
second dividend, at the intensive margin it prevents it. 
7. A higher wage rate promotes extensive labour supply and thus the second dividend [/+] (like in 4.). Although these 
households have pro-environmental preferences we assume them to attach more weight to work-related high energy 
consumption due to their low income and absolute level of consumption [-/].  
8. Intensive labour supply rises too, following the higher wage rate [/-] (like in 5.) and we assume a similar increase in 
substitute consumption [-/]. 
9. The consumption of complements falls after the price rise, but we assume that it is to some extent replaced by low-carbon 
substitutes (such as services) rather than high-carbon substitutes, based on HHs pro-environmental preferences. The impact 
is not expected to be strong though [0/]. Again, the impact of increased labour supply is unclear [/0].  
 
High-skilled HHs 
10. A higher wage rate promotes extensive labour supply for high-skilled workers as well and with it higher consumption of 
high carbon-leisure substitutes, such as private vehicles for commuting. This means a negative impact on environmental 
quality and a positive employment impact [-/+].  
11. Intensive labour demand is assumed to stay the same for high income HHs without environmental preferences, because 
they are further away from subsistence consumption and experience decreasing returns to additional income. This gives 
room for the second dividend as there is no competition between employed and unemployed people to fulfil labour demand. 
We assume that consumption patterns stay the same [0/+]. 
12. The price increase for commodities depresses demand. As high income households are assumed to substitute commodities 
and leisure, the labour supply falls as well, again promoting the second dividend rather than weakening it [+/+]. 
13. Extensive labour supply increases, but HHs with pro-environmental preferences are assumed to use their income for less 
carbon intensive consumption [0/+]. 
14. Intensive labour supply falls following a wage increase. HHs with pro-environmental preferences derive additional utility 
from preserving the natural environment and thus attach a lower weight to utility from income. This reduction is an 
additional stimulation for the second dividend by creating more labour demand, we assume they only reduce intensive 
labour supply so far as to sustain their old consumption habits [0/+].  
15. The increased commodity price lowers the demand for substitute commodities, which likely improves the environment 
[+/]. This reduction will bring about an increased demand for leisure, e.g. to have the time to consume rather time-intensive 
but low-carbon goods, and thus a reduction in labour supply. As, however this reduction can be expected to come from 
already employed people, it would free up jobs for the unemployed and thus be – again contrary to the traditional argument 
– promoting the second dividend, rather than inhibiting it [/+]. 
 
Behavioural case 3: HH-BRHA – Tax salience 
Low-skilled households 
16. No change compared to case 2. The reason is that low income households are already very attentive to prices even without 
tax salience. 
17. No change compared to case 2. See above. 
18. The commodity price increase reduces commodity consumption, which is complementary to leisure and hence promotes 
labour supply. This favours the second dividend if it is at the extensive margin but threatens it when at the intensive margin. 
Thus the overall effect remains unclear [/0]. Due to the over-reaction to the tax we assume an overall reduction in carbon-
intensive consumption, leading to a positive effect on the environment [+/]. 
19. No change compared to case 2. 
20. No change compared to case 2. 
21. Again, the price rise in leisure complements lowers intensive labour supply, thus promoting the second dividend. Due to 
tax salience, we assume that commodities are not replaced by other consumption [+/+].  
 
High-skilled households 
22. No change compared to case 2. 
23. No change compared to case 2. 
24. The price rise induces a demand reduction of leisure substitutes, leading to lower (intensive) labour supply. We assume 
the demand reduction to be stronger under tax salience [++/++]. 
25. No change compared to case 2. 
26. No change compared to case 2. 
27. Again, based on the literature we assume that the demand reduction will be stronger than without tax salience, improving 
the probability of both dividends compared to the second (and first) case [++/++]. 
 
Behavioural case 4: HH-SHA – Status seeking 
Low-skilled households 
28. No change compared to case 2. 
29. Intensive labour supply increases following a higher wage rate, preventing the second dividend. As individuals are seeking 
status, they use their additional income to consume mainstream positional goods, which are typically high-carbon goods 
substitutable to leisure, such as cars, bigger houses, carbon-intensive holidays, etc. [-/-]. 
30. The price increase lowers consumption of complements, but they are likely to be replaced by time-saving high carbon 
consumption, made necessary and financed through increased labour supply [-/-]. 
31. No change compared to case 2. 
32. Intensive labour supply increases after a rise of the wage rate, inhibiting the second dividend. Although the pro-
environmental preferences make households use additional income for supposedly ‘green’ status goods it still increases 
their overall material consumption [-/-]. That is because they cannot afford the free time necessary to truly consume green, 
as that is time-intensive.  
33. The price change leads to a lower consumption of leisure complements, supporting (intensive) labour supply. In the status-
seeking case, where low-skilled green households try to imitate high-skilled green households, they will try hard to 
consume low carbon leisure substitutes to position themselves. This yields environmental improvements but still inhibits 
the creation of new jobs through increased intensive labour supply [+/-]. 
 
High-skilled households 
34. No change compared to case 2. 
35. When agents are status seeking even when their income is high the wage rate will lead to increased labour supply at the 
intensive margin to sustain or expand consumption. This works against both dividends [-/-]. 
36. The price rise induces a demand reduction for commodities. As they are mostly leisure substitutes, this fosters an 
increase in labour supply. When positional consumption matters we assume that consumption levels will at least stay the 
same and be financed through increased labour supply if necessary [0/-]. 
37. No change compared to case 2. 
38. Some status seeking agents may be expected to increase their intensive labour supply even when they have a high 
income and environmental preferences. This can weaken the second dividend. However, any additional income is 
expected to be used for lowering carbon consumption, which is the status symbol of the ‘green elite’, e.g. local and 
seasonal products, and thus be beneficial for the environment [+/-]. 
39. The demand for time-saving leisure substitutes will go down following a price increase favouring more time-intensive 
consumption and hence lower intensive labour supply. For rich households with pro-environmental preferences this 
could be a return to truly green time-intensive status symbols [++/++]. 
 
Firms 
Behavioural case 1: F-RRA – Representative and rational 
1. A higher marginal cost of carbon emissions incentivises firms to improve their carbon efficiency. This improves the 
environment but has not necessarily an impact on labour [+/0]. 
2. The lower cost of labour together with the higher cost of carbon incentivises a shift from labour to carbon which supports 
both dividends [+/+].  
 
Behavioural case 2: F-RHA – Heterogeneity 
All firms 
3-16. The policy induces the same changes across all firms: the higher price of carbon leads to efficiency improvements, and 
together with the lower unit cost of labour induces a factor shift. This always leads to positive effects for the environment 
and employment. A new channel exists that is particularly relevant for small firms: extinction (or market exit). The higher 
cost of carbon will put pressure especially on small energy-intensive firms who operate close to their survival point. This 
increased extinction risk threatens the employment dividend. We assume that the environmental impact of large energy-
intensive firms is stronger than that of small competitors or labour- intensive firms. 
 
Behavioural case 3: F-BRHA – Satisficing 
Energy-intensive 
17. No change compared to case 2. 
18. Extinction rates of small firms are higher under routine use and aspiration levels, because transitions happen slower and 
managers choose from selection of all existing options only. 
19. Higher cost of carbon induces factor shift, but slower. 
20. Lower cost of labour induces factor shift, but slower. 
21. No change compared to case 2, but process expected to be slower. 
22. No change compared to case 2, but process expected to be slower. 
23. No change compared to case 2, but process expected to be slower. 
 
Non-energy-intensive  
24. Small labour-intensive firms who require little energy will potentially perform above their aspiration levels and will thus 
not adjust (except maybe in the very long run). No effect on employment or emissions [0/0]. 
25. The probability of extinction for small labour-intensive firms does not change. Their costs probably get lower, but so do 
those of their competitors. No impact on either of the dividends. 
26. Substitution of carbon through use of labour is probably limited in these industries. However, current trends in robotics 
may be slowed down, leading to a temporary protection of jobs. This favours the second dividend. The impacts for the 
first dividend are probably negligible [0/(+)]. The robotic argument steps a bit outside our analysis and is thus put in 
parentheses. 
27. See 10. 
28. No change compared to case 2, but process expected to be slower. 
29. No change compared to case 2, but process expected to be slower. 
30. No change compared to case 2, but process expected to be slower. 
 
Behavioural case 4: F-SHA – Social innovation 
Energy-intensive 
1. Higher cost of carbon leads to efficiency increases. Under social innovation the speed of transition is higher than in case 
2 [++/0]. 
2. The extinction rates of small firms are probably not increasing significantly if they can cooperate and/or imitate 
successful competitors. Thus there will be no big extinction impact on either of the dividends [0/0]. 
3. Substitution will also happen faster than in the atomistic case 2. The impact on labour may be stronger because of the 
transition speed, or weaker because of less labour requirements due to cooperation. Thus we are not changing it 
compared to case 2 [++/+]. 
4. See 3. 
5. Efficiency improvements motivated by a higher unit cost of carbon are assumed to happen faster. 
6. Substitution of carbon with labour is assumed to happen faster. 
7. See 6. 
 
Non-energy-intensive 
8. If small labour-intensive firms are able to observe and learn from their competitors, efficiency improvements seem more 
likely in this sector. This promotes environmental benefits [+/0]. The result is the same as in the case 2, where firms 
maximise profit, but the reason is different. Here the firms evolve through learning to arrive at a similar result. 
9. The extinction rate for small labour-intensive companies should not become higher, as in case 2 because they can imitate 
the best practice of others, hence improving the chances for an EDD. 
10. No change compared to case 2. But again, result driven by non-market cooperation instead of profit maximisation. 
11. See 10. 
12. Result as in case 2. Firms come close to profit-maximisation over time through social learning and copying their 
competitors’ behaviours. 
13. Substitution is also happening, because in large companies – even if they are labour-intensive – monitoring of routines 
and practices will lead to a factor shift. However, total emission reduction is probably small, but research in efficiency 
improvements creates jobs, which promotes the second dividend. 
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Table 1. Main mechanisms of ETR including effects on households and firms  
Agent Direct effects Indirect effects 
Household 
Nominal wage rate increases (6) Labour supply increases (7) 
Low-carbon goods relatively cheaper than high-carbon 
goods (1) 
Lower total commodity consumption (8) 
Shift from high-carbon to low-carbon goods (8) 
Increase labour supply (7) 
Firm 
Unit cost of carbon increases (1) Reduce carbon emissions (3) 
Unit cost of labour decreases (2) Labour demand increases (4) 
Labour relatively cheaper than carbon (1,2) Substitute carbon with labour (3,4) 
Note: The numbers in the table relate the effects to the arrows of the mechanisms in Figure 1. Column two 
shows primary price effects and column three the associated changes in demand and supply. Commodities 
in our analysis are assumed to be either labour- or carbon-intensive (we sometimes refer to the former as 
‘low-carbon’)
Table 2. Effects of key assumptions on mechanisms of an ETR 
Agent Traditional mechanisms of ETR Additional mechanisms of ETR  
 Direct effects Indirect effects New indirect effects 
Household 
Nominal wage rate 
increases 
Labour supply increases 
Extensive labour supply increases (iii) 
Intensive labour supply may rise or fall (iii)  
Low-carbon goods 
relatively cheaper than 
high carbon goods 
Lower total commodity 
consumption 
Only possible for high income households 
(subsistence limit) (i) 
Shift from high carbon to low 
carbon goods 
Will require more time: lower intensive labour 
supply (ii) (iii) 
Increase labour supply Increase in intensive labour supply (iii) 
Firm 
Unit cost of carbon 
increases Reduce carbon emissions 
Increase carbon efficiency at the margin (e.g. 
optimisation of internal processes or shift to 
renewable energy sources). 
Unit cost of labour 
decreases 
Labour demand increases Hire more workers proportionally 
Labour relatively cheaper 
than carbon 
Substitute carbon with labour 
Direct emission replacement through low-
skilled labour (iv) 
Indirect emission replacement by high-skilled 
labour (iv) 
Note: Extension of Table 1 by the right column based on our literature review. New mechanisms become 
relevant when (i) moving away from homothetic preferences, (ii) dropping weak separability between 
leisure and consumption, (iii) distinguishing extensive and intensive labour supply, and (iv) allowing for 
distinct demand for low- and high-skilled labour.  
 
 










































++/+++ ++/++++ +++/++ 
Note: The four columns show the results of the four household cases. Values left of the ‘/’ symbol refer to 
the environmental dividend, those on the right to the employment dividend.  ‘+’ indicates better chances 
for a dividend to occur, ‘-‘ lower chances, and ‘0’ an unclear effect. The signs are the result of the various 
mechanisms from Tables 1 and 2, working in the same or opposing directions and thus more signs mean a 
higher likelihood of an effect. 
 
 
Table 4. Double dividend potential of an ETR for different firm cases 
Note: The four columns show the results of the four firm cases. Values left of the ‘/’ symbol refer to the 
environmental dividend, those on the right to the employment dividend.  ‘+’ indicates better chances for a 
dividend to occur, ‘-‘ lower chances and ‘0’ that the direction is unclear. Each mechanism (from Tables 1 
or 2) is the source of a sign, working in the same or opposite direction, so more signs indicate a higher 










Representative firm ++/+    
Energy-
intensive 
small  +++/0 ++++/- +++/+ 
large  +++/+ ++/+ +++/+ 
Non-energy-
intensive 
Small  ++/+ 0/(+) ++/+ 
large  ++/+ ++/+ ++/+ 
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